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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-
INFORMED CONSENT GONE AWRY
-A GUIDE TOWARD STATUTORY REFORM
Latham v. Hayes,
495 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1986).
INTRODUCTION
An article on informed consent must justify the space in print
it seeks to occupy, as much has already been written on the sub-
ject,1 and its history is well documented.2 Despite this plethora
of attention, the doctrine remains misunderstood and has failed
to provide the results anticipated in its design. It is important to
distinguish between a lack of consent, which constitutes a bat-
tery, and a lack of informed consent, which is negligence, i.e.
malpractice for not properly informing the patient. The empha-
sis of this work is on the lack of informed consent, specifically
on the duty of disclosure. The Mississippi Supreme Court in
Latham v. Hayes' once again imposed dual standards of duty in
the field of medical malpractice: a national standard for substan-
tive medical care, and a locality standard for informed consent.
Since the adoption of a national standard of care in 1985, the Mis-
sissippi court has decided four cases. In two it has imposed a na-
tional standard of medical care, and only a locality standard for
informed consent. Furthermore, having consistently adhered to
the "objective test" analyses when faced with a doctrinal choice,
Mississippi has produced an informed consent doctrine devoid
of any real patient autonomy. Consequently, the Mississippi in-
formed consent test yields results that are ambiguous, unpredic-
table, and malaligned with the avowed purpose of the doctrine
itself. The time for legislative reform is clearly at hand.
1. Halligan, The Standard of Disclosure By Physicians to Patients: Competing Models of Informed Con-
sent, 41 LA. L. REv. 9 (1980).
2. See generally Meisel and Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent: A Review and
Critique of the Empirical Studies, 25 Anuz. L. REv. 265 (1983); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Prac-
titioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 586-97 (1959); Boland, The Doctrines of Lack of Consent and Lack of In-
formed Consent in Medical Procedures in Louisiana, 45 LA. L. REv. 1 (1983).
3. 495 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1986).
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FACTS
In the spring of 1975 plaintiff Kathryn Latham began to ex-
perience problems with her left ear. It exuded a yellowish pus,
and began to cause dizziness for which she sought medical care.
Doctors determined that the ear contained polyps, as it had dur-
ing her youth. Latham had experienced the removal of such polyps
on three occasions during her childhood. Several office attempts
to remove the current polyps proved unsuccessful, and Latham
was admitted to the University of Mississippi Medical Center for
what she believed to be a "simple operation" to remove the polyps.
Latham claimed that she signed a general consent form for sur-
gery, but that no one advised her either of the procedure involved
or of any risk to the seventh cranial nerve. Two doctors, first and
third year residents, performed the operation on August 19, 1975.
The field of surgery was behind the ear, and upon entry the doc-
tors discovered that a cholesteatoma had created a direct opening
to the brain. The doctors considered the condition life-threatening,
and in an attempt to remove the tumor the seventh cranial nerve
was damaged, resulting in paralysis of the left side of Latham's
face.
Latham sought damages alleging substantive medical malprac-
tice and lack of informed consent, or in the alternative, res ipsa
loquitur. At the close of plaintiffs case a directed verdict was or-
dered for the defendants.' The Mississippi Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient
expert evidence to support a finding of negligence, and to show
the requisite causal connection between the alleged lack of infor-
mation and the injury to prove lack of informed consent. 5 The
court further affirmed on the issue of res ipsa loquitur, holding
that the doctrine was not applicable because the injury in this case
was "not an extraordinary incident or unusual event."6
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Informed consent is a sub-species of medical malpractice,
wherein liability is predicated upon the physician's failure to meet
4. Id. at 455.
5. Id. at 458.
6. Id. at 459 (quoting Sanders v. Smith, 200 Miss. 551, 561, 27 So. 2d 889, 893 (1946)).
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a duty imposed by the courts to disclose information sufficient
for a patient to make an intelligent decision as to what is to hap-
pen to his body. 7 While the majority of courts are in agreement
as to what constitutes medical malpractice, substantial disagree-
ment and confusion results when the elements of informed con-
sent are considered. The reason for this is unclear, although many
problems do arise when informed consent analysis is considered
outside of standard malpractice analysis. Consistent with standard
negligence doctrine, informed consent requires the plaintiff to
prove five basic elements: duty, breach of duty, proximate cau-
sation, causation in fact, and actual damages.8 The focus of this
work is the standard by which the element of duty is judged.
The doctrine of informed consent is but an infant, and authori-
ties seem to agree that the first true informed consent case reported
was Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees9
in 1957. Mississippi first recognized the doctrine in 1970 in Ross
v. Hodges." Mississippi informed consent jurisprudence to date
does not, however, reflect a clear understanding of the requisite
elements to sustain an action, nor of the necessity of consistent
standards being imposed upon a legally mandated duty of dis-
closure. The Mississippi court furthermore fails to recognize that
this form of negligence law - as is the case with all others - is
not amenable to precise definition or unwavering adherence to
classical tests.
For all that appears, the current Mississippi informed consent
"test" may be stated as follows. The physician has a duty to dis-
close those known risks which would be material to a prudent
patient in determining whether or not to undergo the suggested
treatment.1 Consideration of each of the elements of the test will
reveal the inconsistency of the holdings of the Mississippi Supreme
Court, and illuminate areas susceptible to improvement.
7. Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 650-53 (1968).
8. W. PROSSER, J. WADE, V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (7th ed. 1982). Prosser sets
out four elements of a cause of action. Id. at 144. However, the theory is better understood when Prosser's
element number 3 is split into a separate element for proximate cause, and a separate element for causation
in fact. I am indebted to Prof. J. Allen Smith, Miss. College School of Law, for pointing out this distinction to me.
9. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957). However, there is some authority indicating that the first
case was Logan v. Field, 192 Mo. 54, 90 S.W. 127 (1905).
10. 234 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1970).
11. Latham v. Hayes, 495 So. 2d 453, 458 (Miss. 1986); Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385, 392 (Miss. 1985).
19871
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
L Duty
As Judge Learned Hand warned, custom may be some evidence
of the duty of care required, but may never be conclusive: it is
the courts which must impose and define the duty.z Discussed
herein is the duty to inform of material risks. Ambiguity occurs
when determining the standards by which to define the duty.
Because the nature of medical malpractice often requires enlight-
ened deference to the opinions of the medical community when
defining the standards, it is clear that only after hearing the
proffered expert testimony may the courts determine when the
law imposes a duty and the specificity of that duty.13 Once the
duty is imposed, there remains only a question of fact as to whether
there was a breach of the mandated duty. But, to be effective the
law must yield predictable results. Thus, analysis of the elements
determining the nature and character of the duty must be under-
taken before an informed decision may be forthcoming as to when
a duty is imposed, and what defines that duty. The elements of
the informed consent test are:
II. Known Risks
This facet of the test tracks coincidentally with the standard of
substantive medical care required by the courts. It is in integrat-
ing this standard with the third facet of the test, i.e. materiality,
that the Mississippi Supreme Court becomes indecisive. Although
the courts impose a duty to disclose only the known risks, there
currently exist no sound criteria to define what is a "known risk,"
nor any standards by which to judge these criteria. In these mat-
ters, courts should be somewhat deferential to the accumulated
wisdom of the medical profession. Courts may encounter difficulty
in determining the relevancy of a particular medical concept
without illumination from the medical profession as to the practi-
cal applications, implications and limitations on any particle of
medical discovery. Courts have, however, been able to fashion
12. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). See also Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519
P.2d 981 (1974).
13. This is not, strictly speaking, how the analysis manifests itself. Under the majority or Professional stan-
dard [to which Mississippi ascribes], expert testimony is required for the plaintiff to prevail. However, under
neither the Objective nor Subjective theories is any expert testimony required. See Boland, 45 LA. L. REV.
1 (1983).
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basic minimal standards of knowledge, medical judgment, and
skill below which a physician must not fall lest he be in violation
of what society deems an acceptable level of professional com-
petence. 14
The very nature of imposing this minimum requires a standard
by which to measure, and four approaches to this comparison have
been used by the courts." The first and oldest, now applied in
a minority of jurisdictions, is the locality standard. 6 Here the
courts apply a standard of substantive care, medical knowledge,
medical judgment and level of skill in performance determined
by the specific locality in which the doctor practices. This the-
ory, simply put, says that a rural doctor will not be held to the
higher standard of care required of the urban doctor. But with
the advance of time came improved methods of communication
and transportation, medical school admissions became based upon
national standards, the medical profession adopted national stan-
dards of board certification, and medical literature became more
easily disseminated on a national basis. As a result, most juris-
dictions began to impose a greater basic minimum level of com-
petency on even the most rural practitioner. One immediate result
was a state-wide standard of care."7 This was believed to allow
for disparities in rural and urban states. The next standard was
to require a physician to possess and exercise that degree of skill
and care which a physician of ordinary prudence and skill, prac-
ticing in the same or similar community, would have exercised
in the same or similar circumstances. 8 Although there was some
early tendency to limit this to a similar community within the same
state, later developments allowed the standard to be compared
with other states and communities which resembled the jurisdic-
tion in question. Because medicine has advanced on a temporal
14. See Ross v. Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1970). See also supra note 12.
15. The approaches represent a linear progression wherein the geographical base has been increased as the
ease of communication and national standards of learning and practice have changed the acceptable level of
competency. The earliest approach was the locality standard. This was expanded to include the entire state.
Next, the same or similar community, in similar circumstances, became the standard. Finally, there evolved
the national standard, which is the current standard.
16. Robertson v. LaCroix, 534 P.2d 17 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); Ross v. Hedges, 234 So. 2d 905 (Miss.
1970); DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961). Oregon, for example, still adheres to this
standard. See, e.g., Tiedemann v. Radiation Therapy Consultants, 299 Or. 238, 701 P.2d 440 (1985).
17. See, e.g., Ives v. Redford, 219 Va. 838, 842, 252 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1979); Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167
Conn. 609, 617, 356 A.2d 887, 892 (1975).
18. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 868 (Miss. 1985). See, e.g., Bartimus v. Paxton Community Hospital,
120 Il. App. 3d 1060, 1066, 458 N.E.2d 1072, 1078 (1983); Goffe v. Pharmaseal Laboratories, Inc., 90 N.M.
764, 767, 568 P.2d 600, 603-04 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976), affd in part, revd in part, Pharmaseal Laboratories,
Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 568 P.2d 589 (1977).
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rather than a geographical basis,19 the most recent extreme of this
third standard bears a great resemblance to the fourth and final
standard, the national standard. " The national standard is now
the majority rule, and was adopted by the Mississippi court in
1985 in Hall v. Hilbun.1
Having traced the ascendancy to a national standard, it is im-
portant to once again emphasize that informed consent is not a
separate and distinct form of action in negligence totally removed
from medical malpractice - it is malpractice.2 2 Mississippi has sepa-
rated its informed consent doctrine into two rules and has applied
inconsistent standards to the two rules. 3 Prong one is a rule of
substantive law regulating the required professional competence
in medical knowledge, judgment and skill in performing substan-
tive medical procedures." Mississippi clearly adopted a national
standard to regulate this area in Hall v. Hilbun.2' However, the
Mississippi Supreme Court continues to require compliance with
only a locality standard,2 ' and this phenomenon is a primary fo-
cus of this work. Prong two deals with the competency of an ex-
pert to testify in states in which he is not licensed to practice.27
Under this analysis, Mississippi has been consistent in imposing
a national standard. Consequently, an expert otherwise qualified
is not disqualified "per se" by the fact that he practices medicine
outside of the jurisdiction.28
Ironically, in adopting the national standard of care, the Mis-
sissippi court was very careful to point out that the national stan-
dard would apply to the full spectrum of "professional services
contemplated within this duty to concern the entire caring process,
including but not limited to examination, history, testing, diag-
nosis, course of treatment, medication, surgery, follow up and
19. 466 So. 2d at 870. Advances in medicine result primarily from new discoveries in theory and technique.
The advances build upon themselves over a period of time, and are not limited to a particular geographical
region for impetus.
20. Id. at 868 n.5.
21. Id.
22. Recall that lack of consent constitutes a battery, and that lack of informed consent is generally recog-
nized as medical negligence. Boland, 45 LA. L. REV. at 21. See generally Plante, An Analysis of *Informed
Consent,"36 FoRHAM L. REV. 639 (1968); Note, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L.
REV. 1396, 1399-1401 (1967).
23. See infra notes 60-95 and accompanying text.
24. See King v. Murphy, 424 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1982).
25. 466 So. 2d at 873.
26. Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385 (Miss. 1985), and Latham v. Hayes, 495 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1986),
both applied a national standard for substantive care, but only a locality standard for informed consent. The
logic behind this application is not self-evident.
27. 466 So. 2d at 866-67.
28. Id. at 874.
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the like." 9 Given this broad analysis, it is difficult to maintain
that the duty to inform is not regulated by the national standard
as well. This error is particularly egregious when Hall v. Hil-
bun3" so clearly warned against such. "Put another way, a 37 year
old woman ...may be expected to respond to an exploratory
laporotomy the same whether she receives her surgery and
postoperative care in Cleveland, Ohio, or Pascagoula, Mississip-
pi.""' Since the procedures and responses to procedures are predic-
table nation-wide, logic dictates that the known risks are equally
predictable and do not vary greatly depending on where the pa-
tient becomes ill. It does great violence to the credibility of a juris-
diction to hold that the extent of a patient's right to be informed
of the risks attendant to a proposed procedure is regulated not
by his need for autonomy, or the collective knowledge of the med-
ical profession, but by where he happens to be when the proce-
dure is required.
III. Materiality
The test for informed consent requires a physician to disclose
all known risks which would be material to a reasonable patient.
Articulating a satisfactory definition of materiality, and a consis-
tent standard by which to measure this definition, has been a per-
sistent stumbling block for the courts. There are three classical
approaches. " First, the majority rule and the one to which Mis-
sissippi ascribes, is the professional standard." This approach al-
lows the medical profession itself to determine which risks are
legally material. The net effect is that in determining what are
the "known risks" the courts rely on the medical profession to com-
pile a list of known risks attendant to a particular procedure. In
determining materiality under this analysis, the medical profes-
sion also informs the court which risks the patient has a right to
be informed of. As a result, the plaintiff must present an expert
to testify that the risks he complains of having been withheld from
him were indeed material before he may recover."
29. Id. at 871.
30. 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985).
31. Id. at 878.
32. The majority rule is the Professional standard. There are two minority rules; the more common is the
Reasonable Man or Objective theory, and the less popular is Subjective standard.
33. Karp v. Colley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974); Ross v. Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1970).
34. See, e.g., Latham v. Hayes, 495 So. 2d 453, 460 (Miss. 1986); Trapp v. Cayson, 471 So. 2d 375,
380 (Miss. 1985); Ross v. Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905, 909 (Miss. 1970).
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The second analysis applied to materiality is the objective or
Reasonable Man standard. The net effect here is that the jury's
decision as to what is a material risk will decide the standard of
disclosure. As was the case with the Objective standard, testimo-
ny of the plaintiff is not allowed before the jury.
The third analysis manifests a purely subjective disclosure stan-
dard."6 The doctor is required to disclose all known risks. If the
jury should determine that the doctor failed to do so, and that the
risks which were omitted would be material to this particular plain-
tiff, the doctor is held liable. Under pure doctrinal analysis, no
expert is required for the plaintiff to prevail under either the ob-
jective or subjective analyses. However, the practical means of
presenting such a list of known risks, and of presenting and dis-
tinguishing the possible and the probable risks to the jury for con-
sideration requires the knowledge of an expert in some capacity.
IV. Causal Connection
Before a material risk can be described as legally relevant the
plaintiff must present evidence that the non-disclosed risk was both
the proximate cause and the cause in fact of some real injury result-
ing in compensable damages. The Mississippi Supreme Court re-
quires the plaintiff to prove to the jury that "a reasonably prudent
person, fully advised of the material known risks, would not have
consented to the treatment."37 As stated above, Mississippi ap-
plies a purely objective test, never asking whether the particular
patient would have reacted differently than a jury may frnd it would
have acted.
Ross v. Hodges8 was the seminal case for the Mississippi in-
formed consent doctrine. Mrs. Ross complained of a lesion of
the skull, later diagnosed as an "intra-diploic epidermoid." 9 Ross
testified that she was informed that the "surgery would involve
shaving a part of the head and sawing into the cranium for the
purpose of removing the lesion."" During the procedure the saw
penetrated too deeply, causing a neurological deficit in her left
hand, arm, shoulder, and face. Ross testified that "the doctor 'never
mentioned any danger or any risk,' and that she would not have
had the operation if she had thought she might have any paraly-
35. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
36. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
37. Latham v. Hayes, 495 So. 2d 453, 458 (Miss. 1986).
38. 234 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1970).
39. Id. at 906.
40. Id. at 909.
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sis."' Expert testimony stated that "the chance of a neurological
deficit from surgery of this kind is remote and extremely rare,
even though there is always a chance of tearing the dura and the
surface of the cortex." 2 In affirming a directed verdict for the
defendant on the issue of informed consent, the court found that
"Dr. Hodges had complied with the professional standards of neu-
rosurgeons in this and other communities, in terms of disclosure
to the patient." 3
In 1982 the court decided King v. Murphy" and therein expanded
the locality rule for the standard of care and qualifications of ex-
pert witnesses. As indicated above," Mississippi law divides the
standard of acceptable medical practice into two specific rules.
Prong one represents a rule of substantive law which mandates
a minimum duty of the physician defined as "reasonable and or-
dinary care, skill and diligence and the exercise of such good med-
ical judgment as physicians and surgeons in good standing" are
required by law to possess. 6 The locality standard was used to
judge this duty, until it was expanded in King to "the entire state
of Mississippi plus a 'reasonable distance adjacent to state bound-
aries'."47 Prong two represents a rule of evidence." Consistent with
prong one, pre-King law required a prospective expert to have
"practiced in the neighborhood or locality and [be] familiar with
the local standard of care."" King expanded the standard by holding
"an expert witness who is knowledgeable of, and familiar with,
the statewide standard of care shall not have his testimony ex-
cluded on the ground that he does not practice in this state."5"
In 1985, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided Hall v. Hil-
bun," and again expanded the standard for both prongs of the rule.
Hall adopted the majority rule imposing a national standard upon
both prongs of the doctrine, which no longer allowed the physi-
cians in a community to set the standards by which their profes-
sional conduct would be judged. " Although Hall does not address
directly the issue of informed consent, it clearly requires that a
41. Id. at 907.
42. Id. at 909.
43. Id.
44. 424 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1982).
45. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 24.
47. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d at 867.
48. See supra note 27.
49. 466 So. 2d 856, 866 (Miss. 1985).
50. Id. at 867.
51. 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985).
52. Id. at 870.
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physician's practice comport with and be measured against a na-
tional standard of competence and judgment.
Approximately three months after Hall, the court decided Reikes
v. Martin. 3 Plaintiff Martin sought damages for alleged substan-
tive malpractice as well as a lack of informed consent. Martin
underwent a hysterectomy, followed by cobalt irradiation treat-
ments. Martin alleged improperly administered radiation thera-
py "and that her subsequent complications, i.e., sores (ulcers) and
contracture of her leg resulted from the alleged improper radia-
tion treatments.""4 The defendant doctors contended the sores were
not caused by their treatment, but were ordinary pressure sores
which coincidentally developed in the area where she had received
the treatment as a result of the patient's negligence in caring for
herself. The plaintiff also claimed that she was not properly in-
formed of the "known risks of the proposed treatments, so that
she could not make an intelligent decision as to whether to sub-
mit to such treatment or surgery." 5 The court, in a footnote, de-
fined "known risks" as "those which would be known to a careful,
skillful, diligent and prudent practitioner or specialist, in this case
a therapeutic radiologist, practicing in Hattiesburg, Mississippi,
in 1975. ''56 The defendants urged that the plaintiff had failed to
prove the element of causation in informed consent because she
had not alleged that she would not have undergone the treatment
if she had been fully informed of the known risks. The court not-
ed that in this argument the defendant was urging acceptance of
the "subjective" test of Scott v. Bradford.57 However, the court
specifically adopted the "objective" test as propounded in Cobbs
v. Grant,58 which asks not whether this particular patient would
have submitted to the treatments if fully informed, but "whether
or not a reasonably prudent patient, fully advised of the material
known risks, would have consented to the suggested treatment. 59
Therefore, the test which Reikes adopted was that "a physician
must disclose those known risks [known to a therapeutic radiolo-
gist practicing in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, in 1975] which would
be material to a prudent patient in determining whether or not
to undergo the suggested treatment. "60
53. 471 So. 2d 385 (Miss. 1985).
54. Id. at 388.
55. Id. at 392 (citing Ross v Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905, 908 (Miss. 1970)).
56. Id. at 392 n.3.
57. 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
58. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
59. 471 So. 2d at 392.
60. Id.
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Also addressed by the Reikes court was the competency to tes-
tify of an expert witness who had recently moved from Great Bri-
tain to the United States, had not passed the "Flex Test,"61 and
was granted only an institutional license to practice in Louisiana
charity hospitals.62 Defendants urged the incompetency of this ex-
pert witness because he had never practiced in Hattiesburg, Mis-
sissippi. The court held upon remand that this witness should be
evaluated according to the national standards adopted in Hall v.
Hilbun,6" not by the previously overruled locality standards of the
pre-King era.
Decided the same day as Reikes, was Trapp v. Cayson. 6 Cay-
son was complaining of headaches, dizziness, and ringing of the
ears for which an arteriogram65 was performed as a diagnostic
tool. During the procedure, Cayson complained of extreme pain
and registered an elevated pulse rate that the doctors, at the time,
believed to have been caused by a heart attack. Over the next sever-
al days Cayson suffered a progressive weakening of the arms and
legs, a loss of bladder and bowel control, and a loss of feeling
below the neck which culminated in quadriplegia. Expert witnesses
disagreed as to the possible cause of the paralysis, as well as
whether other non-invasive tests should have been performed prior
to the arteriogram."' Evidence was also presented showing that
Cayson had signed the consent form two days before the proce-
dure was explained to him, and that before the explanation Cay-
son had been given 10mg of Valium in anticipation of the
arteriogram. Again experts disagreed as to whether the Valium
would affect the ability to understand the explanation, and whether
obtaining the consent signature prior to the actual explanation was
a breach of standards of care.6 Although the plaintiffs expert was
not a practitioner of Tupelo, Mississippi, admitted to not being
familiar with what the standard practices were in Tupelo, and had
never been there except to testify, he was found competent to tes-
tify by the court "under King v. Murphy and/or Hall v. Hilbun."68
The expert had testified that the standard about which he had
knowledge was "the basic standard set by the examination of the
American Board of Radiology and that standard applies to any-
61. Federal Licensing Examination.
62. The expert was, however, currently employed as an Assistant Professor at LSU Medical School, as
well as serving as the acting Director of Therapeutic Radiology at LSUs Charity Hospital. Id. at 393.
63. 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985).
64. 471 So. 2d 375 (Miss. 1985).
65. Id. at 377.
66. Id. at 377-78.
67. Id. at 378.
68. Id. at 380.
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one who has passed the examination and practices in this coun-
try. 69
Approximately one year after Reikes and Trapp were decided,
the Mississippi Supreme Court decided Marshall v. The Clinic
For Women." In 1976 the plaintiff saw her doctor at the Clinic
to obtain an IUD. Marshall testified that the doctor told her "that
his own wife wore one, and that he would not let his wife wear
something that wasn't safe." Mrs. Marshall further testified that
Dr. Byars also told her, "[N]ow if there's any excessive bleed-
ing, abdominal pain, nausea, dizziness, or fever, be sure to call
me back.""1 After approximately one year of discomfort, the device
was removed. In 1981, the plaintiff tried to become pregnant, and
by 1983 was still unable to maintain a viable pregnancy. Her new
doctor at this time diagnosed the inability to properly conceive
as a result of pelvic inflammatory disease, which the doctor testi-
fied was "directly related to"" the IUD which she had worn some
years ago. Plaintiff, however, failed to offer expert testimony stat-
ing that a warning about pelvic inflammatory disease as a result
of the IUD was required by the standard of care. Consequently,
a directed verdict was granted for the defendants at the close of
plaintiffs case. ' In affirming, the Mississippi Supreme Court held
this was a case requiring the plaintiff to offer expert testimony
on a breach of the standard of care, as well as to prove a "causal
connection between the breach of duty by the defendant and the
injuries suffered by the plaintiff."7" The court held that the "key
question" before it was "whether or not Dr. Byars conformed to
the national standard of care dealing with informed consent for
the insertion of an IUD in October of 1975."" Since the record
did not show any expert testimony offered by the plaintiff on what
the standard of care was, the court held there was no way to con-
clude that the doctor had breached it.
76
INSTANT CASE
Latham v. Hayes77 was decided in September of 1986. In af-
69. Id.
70. 490 So. 2d 861 (Miss. 1986).
71. Id. at 862.
72. Id. at 863.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 865 (quoting Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385, 392 (Miss. 1985)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 495 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1986).
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firming the directed verdict on the issue of negligence, the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not introduce
any expert testimony equating the injury with negligence.78 The
only expert witness, who was also one of the defendants, testi-
fied that a doctor must do everything he could to avoid cutting
the nerve, but that "[Y]ou can't guarantee it won't be cut."79 On
the related issue of informed consent the court held that the plaintiff
had failed to prove a causal connection between the alleged lack
of information and the injury.8" Latham alleged that, in granting
the directed verdict, the trial court had invaded the province of
the jury because there remained unresolved issues of fact.
In the trial court, Latham introduced expert testimony on the
standard of care for informed consent in Jackson, Mississippi,
in August of 1975. The expert stated that this standard required
only that the patient be told that a nerve controlling the face "ran
through the ear and that every effort would be made not to damage
the nerve. Latham vigorously denies she was told anything about
the nerve."81 Despite this evidence, the court held that there was
no evidence that a reasonably prudent patient would have with-
held consent had he been fully informed by Jackson, Mississip-
pi, standards of the material known risks of the operation. "Not
only was it known that the ear drained an obnoxious fluid, con-
tained polyps, and upset the patient's balance, but during the oper-
ation it was also found to contain a cholesteatoma, such as to pose
a life-threatening situation."82 Justice Anderson, writing for a four
member dissent, argued against the apparent holding of the court
that the discovery of an emergency situation could validate an
otherwise invalid consent. 3
Latham also urged on appeal that the trial court erred in failing
to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." The court held that
there was no error here because the doctrine does not apply to
the facts of this case." Although the instrumentality causing the
injury was under the exclusive control of the defendants, the in-
jury which resulted was held by the court not to be of the sort
which occurs only when due care has not been exercised. In an
apparent effort to fortify this holding, the court underscored
78. Id. at 457.
79. Id. at 457-58.
80. Id. at 458.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 461.
84. Id. at 458.
85. Id.
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Latham's attempt to amplify the materiality of the risk to the
seventh cranial nerve inherent in this procedure for informed con-
sent purposes.6 However, when Latham denied being informed
of the risk of nerve damage, the court classified such risk as im-
material and thus required, as a matter of law, no duty of dis-
closure.87 Yet when Latham sought to classify the nerve damage
as an unusual injury which does not occur in the absence of negli-
gence, the court classified the nerve damage as too common to
support pleading res ipsa loquitur.88
Latham next alleged that the trial court erred in requiring her
to present expert testimony on both the standard of care as well
as on a violation of the standard of care. 9 The court held that
Mississippi law has always required expert proof on both issues,
"unless the matter is an issue within the common knowledge of
laymen."9 Offering neither analysis nor citation, the court held
that the issues here "manifestly involve factors beyond the com-
mon knowledge of a lay jury."'" The court held that because
Latham presented no expert testimony declaring a breach of the
standard there was no error." Finally, Latham urged the aboli-
tion of the locality rule for expert witness qualifications. The court
noted its recent holding which accomplished this,93 and held there
can be no error when the trial court admits the only witness
offered." Having thus implicitly recognized a national standard
of care and qualifications for the issue of informed consent, the
court still imposed a locality standard for the duty to inform."
ANALYSIS
The rationale behind imposing dual standards for medical mal-
practice is not self-evident. The Mississippi Supreme Court made
certain in Hall, when it adopted the national standard of care, to
specify that the new standard was to control the entire spectrum
86. Id. at 459.
87. Id. at 458.
88. Id. at 459.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 460.
92. Id.
93. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985).
94. 495 So. 2d at 460.
95. The court also affirmed the trial court on the invalidity and insufficiency of content of the plaintiffs
hypothetical questions as posed to the defendant medical expert. ld. at 457. Also affirmed was a ruling of
the trial court compelling the entry into evidence of the entire deposition of a defendant after the plaintiff sought
to enter only a part thereof. Finally, the court found without merit the plaintiffs motion that the judgment
be set aside as invalid because it was rendered in vacation as opposed to in previous regular term. Id. at 460.
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of medical care. The Mississippi court experienced little difficulty
in requiring a minimum level of medical knowledge to obtain and
maintain a medical license. Even less difficulty should attend re-
quiring that the objective aspects of materiality be regulated by
national standards. Simply because one medical community does
not deem a particular risk material does not mean that this risk
is by definition legally immaterial. This error is particularly egre-
gious when other medical communities have determined the same
risk to be material. A further problem with the professional stan-
dard which Mississippi uses is that, irrespective of whether it is
regulated by the level of learning in the particular locality or the
more appropriate national standard, the plaintiff is never consulted
as to whether the disclosure of a particular risk would have been
material to his decision. Irrespective of how adamant a patient
may be on avoiding a particular risk, if the medical profession
determines the patient has no right to be informed of that risk,
the courts will hold as a matter of law that the plaintiff has no
compensable claim.
Since the adoption of a national standard of care, the Missis-
sippi court has decided four cases. In two it has imposed a na-
tional standard of medical care, and only a locality standard for
informed consent.9" Clearly, it is time for a change towards con-
sistent standards. Furthermore, the informed consent doctrine
presents three opportunities in its current "test" to seek inquiries
of the patient as to what he really would have chosen among the
treatments and alternatives available to him. The current Missis-
sippi doctrine never asks the plaintiff to explain before the jury
what he would have done differently if he had been given the
chance. Mississippi adheres to the objective tests, and thus declares
the doctrinal policy of promoting patient autonomy by a series
of inquiries into what everyone else but the patient himself would
prefer. Such a policy must be viewed with some skepticism. The
patient has no more control over his body now than before the
advent of the doctrine of informed consent. Perhaps the current
doctrine is more appropriately labeled as Legal Consent, rather
than Informed Consent. The remainder of this work focuses on
a guideline proposal for an informed consent statute which adopts
a policy that would achieve something closer to informed consent.
96. In Reikes the court imposed a national standard of care and a Hattiesburg, Mississippi, standard for
informed consent. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text. In Latham the court imposed a national stan-
dard of care and a Jackson, Mississippi, standard for informed consent. See supra notes 77-95 and accompany-
ing text.
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CONC LUSION:
A STATUTORY PROPOSAL
Under medical negligence cases the defendant physician's le-
gal obligations and the plaintiff patient's corresponding rights are
less certain in nature and more flexible in character than in bat-
tery cases, and subject to considerable variation. Therefore, this
obligation is not rigid and cannot be prescribed with specifici-
ty.97 The informed consent doctrine represents a balancing test
which weighs the patient's right to know against what a reasona-
ble doctor must disclose.98 Difficulty is encountered in setting out
a manageable framework which does not obscure the original pur-
pose of the doctrine: to give the patient the controlling voice, in
most situations, in what happens to his body.99 Under the present
tests the voice of the patient is ignored and substituted with the
voice of those considered to be more trustworthy under the cir-
cumstances. °" It is not the contention of this writer that the plain-
tiffs word as to what he would now choose, after an undesirable
result to the treatment is sustained, is not subject to some healthy
degree of skepticism. Simply because the credibility of certain
testimony is subject to careful scrutiny, however, does not war-
rant the removal of that voice from the jury. While it is the duty
of the law to insure that the patient has maximal control over what
happens to his body, it is equally the duty of the law not to im-
pose such onerous burdens on physicians as to substantially con-
tribute to the current "malpractice crisis" and further compromise
what has become a "defensive" practice of medicine. It is well
recognized that to be effective the law must yield predictable
results. Therefore, it becomes necessary to set out guidelines by
which the physician may regulate his practice and in this adher-
ence remain reasonably free from vexatious litigation. This must
not, however, be accomplished at the cost of patient autonomy.
Extensive input from the bench, the bar and the medical profes-
97. Plante, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 653 (1968).
98. W. PROSSER, P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS (5th ed. 1984). Id. at 189. For a balancing
test expanding upon Judge Learned Hand's "Algebraic Formula" as set out in Carroll Towing, see Halligan,
41 LA. L. REv. at 29.
99. "As with 'medical paternalism,' the notion of patient sovereignty can be carried too far: 'Both positions
attempt to vest exclusive moral agency, ethical wisdom, and decision making authority on one side of the rela-
tionship, while assigning the other side a dependent role .... IN]either extreme adequately reflects the cur-
rent nature and needs of health care.' " W. PROSSER, P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS (5th ed.
1984). Id. at 190, n.60 (quoting I PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, A REPORT
ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELA-
TIONSHIP 36 (Oct. 1982).
100. Latham v. Hayes, 495 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1986), Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); see
Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 496 F.2d 878 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845
(1974). See also Plante, 36 FORPHAM L. REV. at 668.
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sion must be sought out and molded into a manageable frame-
work. The courts are not the proper body for this function; such
is the province of the legislature. What follows is a guideline
proposal for a statutory doctrine of informed consent.
L Duty
The traditional approach of the courts has been to start their
analysis by imposing a duty upon the physician, and then to work
backwards to determine the extent of the duty which it has im-
posed. The better approach requires analysis of the facts first.
Only when it has been decided that the patient has both a right
to, and the capability of dealing with, the medical information
in question should a duty be imposed by law to disclose this in-
formation. Taking this approach necessarily requires decisions
based upon "backwards looking" analysis and input. Because this
is the same approach which must be used by the courts in inter-
preting the proposed statute, and because it is also the necessary
starting point in drafting the new statute, it will be the approach
used herein.
In outlining the duty to inform, it must be remembered that it
is the physician who has an affirmative duty to disclose, not the
patient who has an affirmative duty to inquire."' However, the
physician is not required to disclose information which an ordi-
nary person would already be aware of. Nor is there a duty to
disclose information which this particular patient is already aware
of due to either his profession or past experiences." The disclosure
by the physician must be accomplished in common language which
the patient understands.,o 3 Notwithstanding authority to the con-
trary, reasonable attention must be paid to how much the patient
actually does understand; mere disclosure with no attempt to ex-
plain will not suffice.'o It is at this point that careful and realistic
balancing must be undertaken. Close scrutiny must attend a de-
termination of the amount of time such disclosure will take and
101. Meisel and Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent: A Review and Critique of the
Empirical Studies, 25 ARiz. L. REV. 265, 275 (1983). But see the Oregon Informed Consent statute which
requires the physician to make only a rudimentary disclosure, and imposes upon the patient the duty to inquire
if more information is needed. If the patient does not request more information, then the physician has met
his duty. But if the patient does ask for more information, then the physician's duty of disclosure is elevated
almost to a full disclosure level. OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (1977).
102. Information which the patient already has gleaned from other sources is often referred to as "pre-
knowledge." Id. at 277. See also Yeats v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393 P.2d 982 (1964).
103. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
104. Meisel and Roth, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. at 284. The view that no attention need be paid to just how much
the patient actually understands was enumerated in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976).
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the effect this will have upon spiraling medical costs. Further-
more, considering the time necessary to become medically com-
petent and licensed to diagnose and treat a particular malady,
realistic questions must be asked as to the degree of understand-
ing which can be expected by the patient. Studies indicate that
as the amount of information disclosed increases, the level of un-
derstanding of the patient decreases. 5 Consequently, considera-
tion should be given to requirements of written forms which may
be taken home by the patient and digested over a period of time
in less stressful surroundings. The opportunity for a continued
and meaningful dialogue of question and answer should also be
afforded the patient.
There is currently recognized in the patient a constitutional right
to control what happens to his or her body;0 6 however, the duty
to disclose information requisite to an informed choice is not ab-
solute. Although Mississippi has not yet had occasion to apply
them, several exceptions to the duty exist, which may be pleaded
as affirmative defenses by the physician."' One such exception
is traditionally described as the emergency doctrine." Under cir-
cumstances where a patient's refusal of treatment would result in
substantial probability of loss of life or limb, it is considered that
no reasonable person would withhold consent irrespective of the
medical risks involved."° However, the better rule would discard
the emergency doctrine as it exists, and simply impose a duty to
use reasonable care under the circumstances. This allows any
emergency circumstances to be taken into account under standard
analysis as an integral part of the rule, instead of unnecessarily
carving out exceptions. Therefore, even under emergency circum-
105. Meisel and Roth, 25 ARIZ. L. REv. at 284, Epstein & Lasagna, Obtaining Informed Consent: Form
or Substance, 123 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MEDICINE 682, 684 (1969). Furthermore, other studies indicate that
patients who may have fully understood their treatment at the time of disclosure are unable to remember the
information for any significant period of time. Boland, The Doctrines of Lack of Consent and Lack of Informed
Consent in Medical Procedures in Louisiana, 45 LA. L. REV. 1, 34 (1984). A distinction must also be drawn
between understanding sufficient for informed consent and patient recall some time after the procedure. On
this point the studies are terribly inadequate. The issue is whether the patient consented at the time of the proce-
dure; not how much he remembers. See Katz, Informed Consent -A Fairy Tale? 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137 (1977).
106. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40-42, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64 (1976).
107. Mississippi has, however, implicitly recognized the doctrine of therapeutic privilege. See Ross v. Hodges,
234 So. 2d 905, 909 (1970).
108. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972). However, in an insightful dissent,
Justice Blanche of the Louisiana Supreme Court noted the double-edged effect of the emergency doctrine. Com-
menting on the holding of the majority which found that a doctor should have stopped the procedure and await-
ed a chance to get the patient's consent to correct an unsuspected and unconsented-to defect because there was
no "emergency," Justice Blanche wrote, "this writer wonders which way the sword would have swung had
the doctor subjected plaintiff to another operation which may' either [have] caused her serious pain and suffer-
ing or possibly loss of life." Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d 859, 868 (La. 1983).
109. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d at 243-44, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
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stances, a reasonable effort should be made to secure consent from
other available sources. 11°
Another traditional exception to the duty of disclosure is called
the doctrine of therapeutic privilege."1 The doctor has a duty to
take into account the total welfare of the patient, and should he
determine in his good medical judgment that the disclosure of cer-
tain risks would not be in the patient's best interests, he may with-
hold this information from the patient under color of the
privilege." 2 It should be noted, however, that as the gravity of
the risk increases, the privilege accordingly decreases. The ap-
proach of most jurisdictions that have enacted statutes on informed
consent has been not to include this doctrine in the statute, but
simply to allow the courts to continue to apply it as a common
law doctrine. 3 The better approach includes the doctrine within
the statute and seeks to limit its scope, because a therapeutic
privilege doctrine liberally construed by the courts may quickly
"swallow up the imposed duty to disclose""' set out in the statute.
There is also a well recognized exception to the duty to dis-
close when the patient chooses to forego or waive his right to in-
formation.' This, as well as the previous two exceptions, has
traditionally been approached as an affirmative defense. To pre-
vent either liberal or strict construction of these "exceptions" from
doing great violence to the avowed purpose of the doctrine of in-
formed consent, these subjects should be addressed and limited
accordingly in the statute.
II. Known Risks
This facet of the proposed legislation would represent nothing
more than statutory recognition of the national standard of care
110. Legal guardians, relatives, etc. Boland, 45 LA. L. REV. at 18.
Ill. Salgo v. Stanford Univ., 154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181 (1957), Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242
N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
112. Otherwise stated, the "physician has two duties: to do what is best for his patient and to make adequate
disclosure." When in conflict, however, the "primary duty of doing what is best for the patient must prevail."
Boland, 45 LA. L. REV. at 18.
113. Of the 23 states which currently have an informed consent statute, only five contain a provision recog-
nizing the therapeutic privilege doctrine. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 507 C:I & 507 C:2; N.Y. [PuB. HEALTH] LAW § 3805-d (McKinney 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
1301.103 (Purdon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 (1977). For a comprehensive listing of statutes, see
Halligan, 41 LA. L. REV. at 59 nn.208, 211.
114. Boland, 45 LA. L. REV. at 18.
115. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972), Salgo v.
Stanford Univ., 154 Cal. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957). See also Meisel, The Exceptions to the Informed Con-
sent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV.
413-16.
1987]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
for Mississippi physicians as set out in Hall v. Hilbun. 6 Because
the current majority of jurisdictions requires compliance with a
national level of medical competence, statutory recognition of this
standard works no hardship on the medical profession. However,
legislative attention should be focused on how to define the duty
of a physician to inform about risks of which he is not personally
aware, but should be.""7 Some attempt must be made to regulate
just how "current" the national standard of care requires a physi-
cian to maintain his medical knowledge in accord with research
and developments.
III. Disclosure Of Medical Alternatives
Mississippi informed consent law currently does not require phy-
sicians to disclose to the patient the reasonable alternatives to the
suggested course of treatment. To label as informed a decision
which considers the risks of only one procedure cannot be recon-
ciled with the doctrinal purpose of meaningful patient autonomy.
However, care must be used in attempting to define what is a
reasonable alternative. The Hall court apparently unwittingly ad-
dressed this facet of the test, but considered it only in requiring
that a doctor have the knowledge of reasonable alternatives as
required by the national standard of care." 8 It is at this juncture
that the known risks and reasonable alternatives dovetail into a
single rule. Certainly, if the law requires a physician to be aware
and in command of the reasonable medical alternatives, and to
consider and choose from those alternatives consistent with pru-
dent medical judgment, it adds no great burden to require that
the patient be informed of these same reasonable alternatives. But
what should be the determinative factors constituting a "reasona-
ble alternative"? How current must a physician stay with research
and development? What rate of success of a new treatment is re-
quired before a new treatment must be disclosed as an alterna-
tive? How long must a new treatment or procedure have been
available before a physician has breached his duty by not educat-
ing himself as to it and informing of it? In considering alterna-
tives, cost of the new or different treatment must be considered,
but how heavily? If the physician believes a patient cannot afford
116. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871-72 (Miss. 1985).
117. Although the consensus is that there is no duty to inform of risks of which the doctor is not aware,
the physician may be subject to a cause of action for nondisclosure of risks of which he should have been
aware. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
118. 466 So. 2d at 871.
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a different treatment, does this mean the patient has no right to
hear of it and at least try to find a way to pay for it?1. Further,
if a physician simply does not believe a new technique to be su-
perior to his own, does this mean the patient has no right to be
informed of it? These questions represent only some of the is-
sues which the legislature must consider and attempt to resolve
in drafting its informed consent statute.
In requiring the disclosure of alternatives, the legislature should
also require disclosure of the material risks attendant to a deci-
sion by the patient to forego all forms of treatment. 2 This duty
should apply equally to treatment and diagnostic procedures,
regardless of whether the patient has decided to accept the pro-
posed procedure."' This requirement imposes no great hardship
on the physician as he is required by law to possess a minimal
level of knowledge consistent with a national standard, and noth-
ing more. The levels of knowledge necessary to recognize a par-
ticular condition and its possible treatments, and the knowledge
of what will occur if such treatments are not undertaken are closely
correlative, if not coincidental. The additional duty, if in fact there
is any, is minimal as it is highly unlikely that a physician could
or should convince a patient that a treatment is necessary without
telling him of the dangers in foregoing the proposed treatment
altogether. The concept of informed refusal is but the opposite
side of the coin of informed consent - in reality not an added
duty at all.
119. Regarding the previous two questions, an interesting dilemma has recently arisen. However, there are
as of this writing no reported cases directly on point.
The release of new iodinated contrast agents that are much safer and more expensive poses a dilem-
ma for radiologists. According to data from the manufacturers, we are currently performing about
5.2 million contrast studies per year, and at a cost of about $7.00 per examination, the cost of ionic
contrast agents is nearly $37 million annually in the United States. Experts estimate there are also
about 520 deaths and 1,800 major life-threatening reactions per year. The safer new agents... if given
to everybody, could significantly decrease the occurrence of adverse effects and increase the expendi-
tures on contrast media to above $300 million per year.
Wolf, Safer, More Expensive lodinated Contrast Agents: How do we decide?, 159 RADIOLOGY 557 (1986).
See also White and Halden, Liquid Gold: Low Osmality Contrast Media, 159 RADIOLoGY 559 (1986). The
real dilemma presents itself to State and Federal medical institutions charged with providing indigent care.
Does the indigent patient have the right to be given the alternative of the more expensive but less dangerous
contrast media? Can these institutions survive the budget crunch and still absorb the added cost? Ultimately,
the legislatures must decide what is an acceptable risk in regard to whether the older and less safe drugs are
still sufficient for human use.
120. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
Failure of the physician to disclose to his patient all relevant information including the risks to the
patient if the test is refused renders the physician liable for any injury legally resulting from the pa-
tient's refusal to take the test if a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position would not have
refused the test if she had been adequately informed of all of the significant perils.
Id. at 291, 611 P.2d at 905, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
121. Boland, 45 LA. L. REV. at 13 n.89.
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IV. Materiality
Before there can be any duty to disclose a particular risk, there
must first be a determination that the risk is a material one. This
determination is at best dubious in a majority of jurisdictions which
consider as evidence only what the medical profession itself de-
termines to be a material risk.12 Deficient also is the objective
test analysis, wherein the jury alone determines what it believes
to be a material risk.l2 3 And under the subjective analysis the jury
determines what it believes the patient would consider a material
risk." ' As has been frequently reiterated herein, the purpose of
the informed consent doctrine is to insure meaningful patient au-
tonomy. Consequently, the veracity of a doctrine devoid of
representation from the patient is extremely suspect. When the
underlying purpose for the doctrine is kept firmly in mind, op-
timal fidelity is maintained only through a combined use of the
three current theories.
Ultimately, it is the facts of the particular case which must de-
termine and define the duty. However, jurisdictions imposing the
same basic standard may still differ in their definitions of materi-
ality. Some jurisdictions consider material a risk which would,
if disclosed, cause the patient to change his mind about submit-
ting to the procedure.2 Others require that the information must
have only some effect on the patient's decision.2 6 No jurisdiction
has yet defined the concept in a satisfactory manner. Although
this is never stated, logic dictates that all of the definitions cur-
rently in use depend ultimately on the facts of the particular situ-
ation. They simply fail by referring to the wrong persons for
disclosure of those facts.
Under the professional and objective standard analyses, the
plaintiff is never consulted as to what emphasis he would place
on the gravity of a particular risk. Under the subjective analysis
the medical profession is not consulted as to its opinions on the
materiality of a particular risk. The shortcomings of all three of
these systems when considered alone will be obviated by the dis-
cussion of causal connection which follows. As indicated above, 2 7
the individual elements of informed consent do not stand alone
and are not susceptible to clear delineation. Materiality and cau-
122. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
125. See Halligan, The Standard of Disclosure By Physicians to Patients: Competing Models of Informed
Consent, 41 LA. L. REV. 9, 27 (1980).
126. E.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1980).
127. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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sation may appear separate and distinct under a pure doctrinal
analysis. Practically speaking however, the considerations dove-
tail with each other. As a result of this relationship, from a prac-
tical standpoint, any definition of materiality short of what is
required to change the mind is almost irrelevant.
Courts frequently over-emphasize materiality in their analyses,
but it should be recognized that materiality is not the dispositive
determination in the plaintiffs case.18 A determination of materi-
ality yields only a prima facie case. A result of this over-emphasis
is that courts do not allow plaintiff/patient testimony on the issue
of what importance he would place on the disclosure of a partic-
ular risk for fear that incredible, self-serving testimony will be
believed by the jury."' Because causal connection must be proved
to recover, a questionable determination of materiality has very
little real effect (except perhaps in establishing precedent).
No statute can be truly dispositive on materiality, but in estab-
lishing a guideline Mississippi should borrow from other juris-
dictions. The Louisiana informed consent statute contains a very
useful definition of materiality,"3° which should be consulted and
enhanced. The particular deficiency which must be addressed is
an allowance for factual considerations of each particular case.
Therefore, no statute adopted should create substantive rights; it
must only represent a rule of evidence which allows the parties
to present facts which influenced their decisions.
V. Causal Connection
A determination of materiality means nothing in a vacuum. If
the disclosure of a risk is not material under the discrete facts
128. To recover, the plaintiff must prove both that the undisclosed risk was a material one, and secondly,
that the nondisclosure was both the proximate cause and cause in fact of the resulting injury.
129. "To permit the plaintiff to change the decision afterwards is the equivalent to looking at the answer
without solving the problem." Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 160-61, 136 S.E.2d 617, 622 (1964). See also
Plante, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. at 668.
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40 (1977) provides:
A. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, written consent to medical treatment means a con-
sent in writing to any medical or surgical procedure or course of procedures which (a) sets forth
in general terms the nature and purpose of the procedure or procedures, together with the known
risks, if any, of death, brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of function of any
organ or limb, or disfiguring scars associated with such procedures, (b) acknowledges that such
disclosure of information has been made and that all questions asked about the procedure or proce-
dures have been answered in a satisfactory manner, and (c) is signed by the patient . ...
B. Except as provided in Subsection A of this section, no evidence shall be admissible to modify or
limit the authorization for performance of the procedure or procedures set forth in such written
consent. ...
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of a particular case the plaintiff should not recover. However,
under two of the three approaches currently in use, the plaintiff
is never consulted as to what he would have done had he known
all which the law now says he had a right to know. Until the in-
put of the patient and doctors involved is received into evidence,
the jury cannot realistically determine what would have been
reasonable under the circumstances. What would be material un-
der circumstances different from those at issue is legally irrele-
vant. Therefore, under strict negligence analysis, without the
testimony of the two parties involved there can be no duty im-
posed. Although a jury may be competent to determine proxi-
mate cause of an injury without the testimony of either the plaintiff
or the doctor involved, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove
causation in fact without some testimony by the plaintiff in the
case.
Materiality is generally defined on a standard independent of
the considerations of causal connection. Materiality may be de-
fined in different ways: i.e. to change the mind,13' to influence
the decision,"' or to have some effect on the patient's decision."'
However, to prove causal connection the plaintiff must prove that
he would have changed his mind had he known of the risk in ques-
tion. The net effect of this is that any jurisdiction which defines
materiality by a minimalist standard, such as having some effect,
or anything short of a change of mind, has no practical effect on
the outcome of the case. In effect those courts are requiring two
standards: one for determination of materiality to impose a duty,
and another to determine causal connection. A determination of
materiality, short of convincing the jury that the plaintiff would
have changed his mind had he known of the particular risks, is
case dispositive for the defendant.
The emphasis of the informed consent doctrine is patient au-
tonomy. Current Mississippi doctrine allows the medical profes-
sion to determine what is a material risk. The jury determines
whether the disclosure of the material risks would have caused
the jury itself (not the patient) to change its mind in a similar sit-
uation. Materiality can also be defined as "rational importance
considered objectively." Then, reliance is defined as the "actual
subjective decision making" based on materiality. Normally, a
plaintiff must prove both to recover. "Cause-in-fact denotes the
131. See supra note 125.
132. Id.
133. See supra note 124.
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materialization (not materiality) of the risk.""1 ' Actually, reliance
is necessary to prove causation in fact. Nowhere under the majority
analysis is the plaintiff allowed to testify before the jury as to what
he would have preferred to occur to his body under the circum-
stances. Thus the plaintiff himself offers testimony on neither
materiality nor causation in fact. A determination of causation
in fact under the objective analysis also removes proof from the
jury of any actual reliance by the plaintiff.
Under the subjective analysis the doctor has no voice in what
he or the medical profession considered material because materi-
ality is a jury question. The jury decides what it thinks the plain-
tiff would have done had he known what the jury now has
determined that the patient had a right to know. At least some
patient autonomy is considered, but in most cases the jury is in-
competent to determine the proper medical action under the cir-
cumstances.
The better view allows the doctor as well as the patient to testi-
fy on materiality. This testimony should be considered to be "some
evidence" of materiality. Taking all of this into consideration, the
jury should then determine what it, or the hypothetical reasona-
ble man, would have done under the circumstances. Only after
hearing testimony from both parties involved is the jury compe-
tent to do this. When determining causal connection, however,
the testimony of the physician is of minimal relevance. There-
fore, the testimony of the plaintiff should be considered as "some
evidence" of causation, with the analysis of this testimony in light
of what the jury considers reasonable under the circumstances be-
ing the final arbiter of the consideration. A proper cautionary in-
struction on the potential bias of the plaintiffs and defendant's
testimony is sufficient safeguard. Negligence is a finding that
someone acted unreasonably under the circumstances. Until the
jury is made aware of these circumstances it cannot render an
informed decision. Under the informed consent doctrine, the heart
of the controversy is whether the considerations of the two in-
dividuals involved were reasonable.
Negligence does not occur in a vacuum. It occurs in a discrete
factual situation. Until the facts are exposed to the jury, and un-
der the informed consent doctrine only the parties are aware of
134. Halligan, supra note 1, at 27.
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those facts, then there can be no finding of negligence."'
The preferred course of action would be to enact a statute based
upon the collective judgments of the bench, the bar and the med-
ical profession as perceived through the multifarious considera-
tions of the legislature. The statute must not, however, be so
narrow in scope as to disallow consideration of the factual intrica-
cies of each case. Considerable license must still be given to the
medical community, but by seeking the combined wisdom of all
of the parties listed above, a valid attempt may be made to reasona-
bly regulate the medical profession with the law, instead of vice-
versa. Both the doctor involved and the plaintiff/patient must have
a voice in the litigation. Each must be able to try to convince the
jury that he is the reasonable man under the circumstances of the
case. Although the proposed statute is presumptive evidence of
how the law has decided reasonable men ought to act in certain
circumstances, the facts of the case demand consideration so that
if the particular fact situations require a result inconsistent with
the broad legislative mandate, then that may be accomplished.
Reasonable behavior under the circumstances must be the final
yardstick of legal liability. Therefore, the statute must not create
substantive rights. 36 The statute must only be presumptive evi-
dence of what the law considers reasonable behavior. Even if the
doctor fails to comply with the letter of the statute he must be
free to convince the jury that his actions were reasonable; the same
is also true for the patient. Rebuttal of the statutory presumptions
should, however, require clear and convincing proof.
Until the testimony of the parties is before the jury, a solid de-
termination of negligence is not readily obtainable. The distinc-
tion between informed consent and obtaining a signature on a
consent form must be kept firmly fixed in mind.137 It is only by
adding the testimony of the parties to the litigation that the appli-
cation of the doctrine of informed consent can provide for
meaningful patient autonomy and move away from its current sta-
tus which provides only Legal Consent.
R. Allen Flowers
135. It is feasible to base consent in an emergency situation, when no person with authority to give consent
can be found, upon what a reasonable man would have done under the circumstances. But when the patient
is available, and the doctor is available to testify as to his considerations relevant to the determinations which
were actually made, and how those decisions would or could have been different under different circumstances,
then at least the jury has some evidence of what the parties believe. After discrediting the impeached testimo-
ny, as juries have always been considered competent to do, the jury may determine what it considers was reasona-
ble under the circumstances. Strict adherence to either the professional or objective theories is a preliminary
adjudication that the parties involved cannot be believed before even hearing what they have to say.
136. See Boland, supra note 2, at 26 n.159.
137. Meisel and Roth, supra note 2, at 334.
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